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1  Introduction 
When a firm produces a negative externality, the firm is blamed for it and it often 
causes a storm of protest. For instance when Shell planned to sink its oil storage Brent Spar, 
public  and  political  opposition  resulted.  There  exist  also  many  examples  for  positive 
externalities as a side effect of payoff maximization. A poetic example is the case of the 
honey  producer,  but  also  knowledge  spillovers  are  abundant.  In  contrast  to  negative 
externalities it is however difficult to find examples that show reward in response to these 
positive externalities. This asymmetry has been confirmed by the experimental philosopher 
Joshua Knobe (2003) who conducted a questionnaire study in which subjects could attribute 
intentions to the producer of positive and negative externalities. He finds that people attribute 
intentions to producers of foreseen negative externalities but not to producers of foreseen 
positive ones. We are interested in the reason behind this asymmetry. Why do people blame 
others for negative externalities but do not reward them for positive ones?  
Many studies have shown that perceived intentions play a major role for reciprocal 
behavior. For example intentions are important in law (Huang (2000)) where they help to 
determine whether somebody is sentenced for murder or manslaughter. People’s ascriptions 
of intentions also have important consequences in economic markets. A study by Charness 
and Levine (2002) shows that selfish intentions are crucial for people's perceptions of fairness 
in  consumer  markets.  They  also  affect  people's  reciprocal  behavior  in  the  labor  market 
(Kahneman  et  al.  (1986)).  These  results  lead  us  to  the  question  of  whether  ascription  of 
intentions  drives  this  asymmetric  behavior  with  respect  to  externalities,  and  how  people 
attribute intention in this context. The impact of intentions on reciprocal behavior has been 
discussed  in  economics  for  some  time.  The  growing  literature  covers  intentions  both 
theoretically and experimentally. However, we are the first to analyze perceived intentions for 
externalities.  
In theoretical economics, various models assign intentions an important behavioral role. 
In  the  models  of  Rabin  (1993),  Dufwenberg  and  Kirchsteiger  (2004)  and  Falk  and 
Fischbacher (2006) intentional kindness is inferred from which choice has been made – taking 
into account the available alternatives. A different approach has been taken by Levine (1998) 
and Charness and Rabin (2002) who measure the intention with the type of a player. Those 
who value other peoples’ payoff positively are considered as intentionally kind while those 
who value it negatively are considered as intentionally unkind.  
The experimental part of the literature discusses the impact of intentions on reciprocal 
behavior.  Charness  and  Levine  (2007)  divide  most  studies  that  analyze  intentions   3 
experimentally into a two-class approach-categorization. The first class compares responses to 
choices made by a random draw (unintentional choices) to choices made by a counterpart 
(intentional choices). The second category includes studies that compare responses to choices 
that are made by a counterpart and that differ in their set of alternatives. The same choice can 
be either intentionally friendly or intentionally unfriendly.  
There are studies in both categories that find that negative intentions matter (Blount 
(1995), Brandts and Sola (2001), Nelson Jr. (2002), Charness and Rabin (2002), Falk et al. 
(2003), Offerman (2002), Charness (2004), Charness and Rabin (2005), Charness and Levine 
(2007), and Falk et al. (2008)). There is also evidence that negative intentions do not cause 
negative reciprocity (Bolton et al. (1998), Cox and Deck (2005), Houser et al. (2008)). With 
respect to positive intentions, there is evidence for reciprocity (Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher 
(2008), Charness and Levine (2007)) and for no reciprocity (Offerman (2002), Cox and Deck 
(2005), Houser, Xiao, McCabe and Smith (2008)). The studies give mixed evidence whether 
intentions have important consequences for reciprocal behavior. However, all of these studies 
define unfriendly moves as harming moves under payoff maximization and friendly moves as 
helping  moves  including  a  reduction  of  the  own  payoff.  None  of  these  studies  includes 
positive externalities in the sense of positive side effects of payoff maximization. This idea 
was first introduced by Knobe (2003). In his questionnaire study he uses the following two 
vignettes. 
HARM Story  
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, 'We are thinking 
of  starting  a  new  program.  It  will  help  us  increase  profits,  but  it  will  also  harm  the 
environment.' The chairman of the board answered, 'I don't care at all about harming the 
environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let's start the new program.' They 
started the new program, the company increased its profits and the environment was harmed. 
Question: Did the chairman of the board intentionally harm the environment? 
HELP Story  
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, 'We are thinking 
of  starting  a  new  program.  It  will  help  us  increase  profits,  and  it  will  also  help  the 
environment.'  The  chairman  of  the  board  answered,  'I  don't  care  at  all  about  helping  the 
environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let's start the new program.' They 
started the new program, the company increased its profits and the environment was helped. 
Question: Did the chairman of the board intentionally help the environment?   4 
These two stories are almost identical; only the word hurt was replaced by the word 
help. 78 people in a Manhattan public park were randomly given one of the two questions. 
82%  of  subjects  who  had  to  answer  the  HARM  Question  said  the  chairman  harmed  the 
environment intentionally but only 23% of subjects who had to answer the HELP Question 
claimed that the chairman helped the environment intentionally. Thus, the change of a single 
word from hurt to help leads to a complete change in peoples' intuitions. In experimental 
philosophy  this  result  is  known  as  the  Knobe  effect  or  side-effect  effect.  Knobe  (2006) 
suggests that whether an action's side effect is perceived as good or bad influences people's 
ascriptions of intentionality to this side effect. The Knobe effect is stable with respect to 
framing (Adams and Steadman (2007), Machery (2008), Wright and Bangson (2009)), moral 
status of the outcome (Mallon (2008)), age (Leslie et al. (2006)), cultural background (Knobe 
and Burra (2006)), and order of presentation (Nichols and Ulatowski (2008) and Wright and 
Bangson (2009)). 
In  all  these  studies  the  use  of  the  word  intentional  is  critical  since  the  concept  of 
intentionality is individually defined. It is unclear what people exactly mean when they use 
the word intentional. In our study we measure attribution of intentions by indirect reciprocity. 
We introduce third-party reward and punishment for producers of externalities. The advantage 
of our design is that we can directly compare punishment and reward. Former studies treat 
reward and punishment differently. For example, in Offerman (2002), Bolton, Brandts and 
Ockenfels  (1998),  Charness  and  Levine  (2007),  Rand  et  al.  (2009)  and  Falk,  Fehr  and 
Fischbacher (2008) punishment is efficiency reducing, while reward is not. This means that 
effects cannot be directly compared and punishment and reward must be treated separately. In 
our study reward and punishment are costless for the punisher. Punishment is equivalent to 
withhold reward and vice versa.  
We economize the Knobe vignettes in order to test not only whether intention matters 
but how people attribute intention when externalities are caused. In this manner we challenge 
the Knobe effect without the use of any specific language term. We investigate the stability of 
the Knobe effect and analyze the crucial economic determinants. The original vignettes do not 
indicate any details on the agents' economic status nor the extent of the externalities and 
therefore leave it to the participant to form a view of the situation. We use three different 
settings varying the agents’ economic status and the size of the positive externalities. 
We find that the major determinant of the Knobe effect is the relative distribution of 
economic power among the players. We confirm the Knobe effect only in situations where the 
producer of the externality holds the higher economic status and the positive externalities are   5 
small. Switching economic power makes the  Knobe effect vanish. Finally, increasing the 
positive externalities even reverses the Knobe effect. We compare the results with theoretical 
predictions and find that they are in line with a naïve version of Levine (1998). 
We complete our experiment by running two questionnaire studies in order to test our 
experimental findings using Knobe’s method. In one study we replicate the original Knobe 
questions. The second study modifies the Knobe questions by switching the economic status 
of the agents. The questionnaire results confirm the experiment results. The Knobe effect only 
persists in the original Knobe questions including an active agent with high economic status.  
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we present the experimental 
design and procedure followed by the design of the questionnaire studies and procedure. In 
Section 4 we describe our hypotheses. Results are given in Section 5. Section 6 discusses and 
concludes. 
2  Experimental Design and Procedure 
In order to test Knobe's claim that people are willing to blame other people for negative 
foreseen  externalities,  but  are  not  willing  to  praise  them  for  positive  ones,  we  use  the 
following basic three player game as shown in Table 1. Player 1 has to choose between 
allocation X and Y. We frame X as default and give player 1 the option to change to allocation 
Y. If player 1 chooses X, he receives X1 and player 2 receives X2. If he chooses Y, player 1 
receives Y1 and player 2 receives Y2. X represents the firm's and environment's situation at the 
time when vice-president and chairman of the board are talking in their office. Y represents 
the  situation  after  the  start  of  the  program.  Since  the  firm  always  gains  by  choosing  the 
program, it is necessary that X1<Y1. In the story with negative externalities, the environment 
experiences  some  loss,  so .  Within  the  story  with  positive  externalities,  we 
assume .  As  we  are  interested  in  whether  people  are  influenced  by  the  caused 
externalities, we control for other possible influences and use the same allocation Y for both 
kinds of externalities. The games differ only in allocation X. 
Our experimental design corresponds to the story by Knobe as follows: Player 1 is in 
the role of the firm and player 2 is the environment. Player 2 has no decision to make. Player 
3 is in the role of the reader of the story and is therefore not involved in player 1's decision. 
He receives an endowment of 100 points independent from player 1’s decision. By this means 
player 3’s decision is not affected by envy. After learning player 1's choice, player 3 is free to 
transfer points from player 1 to player 2 or the other way around. This transfer is costless for 
player 3, since we are interested in all participants' assessments of intentionality and not only   6 
in  the  non-selfish  participants'  transfer.  Player 3 ’s  decision  whether  to  redistribute  points 
between player 1 and player 2 reflects whether he thinks that player 1 is blameworthy or 
praiseworthy for the caused externalities. In other words: Does player 3 attribute intentionality 
to player 1? Does he punish decisions including negative externalities more than he rewards 
decisions with positive externalities? 
 




   
player 1        with  
player 2        with ,   
Table 1: Basic Game 
 
Since the Knobe questions do neither provide any information on specific losses nor 
gains  for  the  firm  or  the  environment,  nor  do  they  indicate  any  details  on  their  relative 
endowments, the story sets leave it to the participant to form a view of the situation. Setting I 
models how most people probably understand the story. A strong active agent is affecting a 
weak passive one. Hurting really hurts and helping rarely helps. We use Setting I in order to 
confirm the Knobe effect in the laboratory. 
In Setting II we switch the economic status of the two agents. Now a weak active agent 
is affecting a strong passive one. Hurting still hurts and helping still rarely helps. In Setting III 
we vary Setting II. Hurting still hurts, but helping now also really helps. Every setting consists 
of three games: In the first game (harm) the allocation Y can be reached through negative 
externalities. The second game (help) involves positive externalities in order to reach Y. The 
third  game  does  not  include  any  externalities.  It  is  simply  the  allocation  Y  without  any 
alternative as control for player 3's general inequality aversion.  
There are two main advantages of our design. First, many different settings can be 
easily modeled. Second, former studies treat reward and punishment differently. Many studies 
analyze only one kind of targeted interaction - either reward or punishment. Those studies that 
implement  both  reward  and  punishment  (such  as  Offerman  (2002),  Bolton,  Brandts  and 
Ockenfels  (1998),  Charness  and  Levine  (2007),  Rand,  Dreber,  Ellingsen,  Fudenberg  and 
Nowak (2009) and Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2008)) use costly reward and punishment. 
Therefore punishment is efficiency reducing, while reward is not. This means that effects 
cannot be directly compared and punishment and reward must be treated separately. We can 
perfectly compare reward and punishment. Since reward and punishment are costless for the   7 
punisher, punishment is equivalent to withhold reward and vice versa. Thus, we get a clean 
direct comparison of positive and negative reciprocity. In this way, we are able to bring 
experimental  philosophy  into  the  laboratory  and  test  subjects’  behavior  in  a  controlled 
environment with real monetary consequences.  
 
    X (harm)  Y  X (help) 
player 1  50  60  50  Setting I 
player 2  50  30  20 
player 1  20  30  20  Setting II 
player 2  80  60  50 
player 1  20  30  20  Setting III 
player 2  80  60  20 
Table 2: Settings I-III 
Setting  I:  Active  agent  holds  higher  economic  status,  relatively  weak  positive 
externalities 
Setting I represents how we think most people perceive the Knobe questions. First, the 
active  player 1   holds  the  higher  economic  status  in  both  allocations  X  and  Y.  That 
means , and  . Second, the positive externalities are weaker than 
player  1’s  gain  by  choosing  Y,  which  yields .  Third,  there  is  no 
efficiency gain under Y in the situation with negative side effects.  
In  the  game  with  negative  externalities  both  players  receive  50  points  as  basic 
endowment. Player 1 can choose to switch to allocation Y and increase his profits by 10 
points.  If  he  decides  to  do  so,  player 2  w i l l  lose  20  points.  In  the  game  with  positive 
externalities player 1 receives 50 points and player 2 receives 20 points as basic endowment. 
Player 1 has to decide whether he wants to increase his profits by 10 points, meaning that 
player 2 will also gain 10 additional points. 
Setting  II:  Active  agent  holds  lower  economic  status,  relatively  weak  positive 
externalities 
In all questionnaire studies conducted so far such as Knobe (2003), Mallon (2008), 
Leslie,  Knobe  and  Cohen  (2006),  Machery  (2008)  or  Wright  and  Bangson  (2009),  the 
producer  of  the  externality  holds  the  higher  economic  status.  That  is  why  we  switch  the 
economic status of the agents. In Setting II. While in Setting I the active player 1 holds the 
higher economic status, now player 2 holds the higher economic status in both allocations X 
and Y, which means , and  . There is still no efficiency gain under   8 
Y  in  the  game  with  negative  externalities  and  the  positive  externalities  are  still  weak 
( ).  
As basic endowment in the harm condition player 1 receives 20 points and player 2 
receives 80 points. Player 1 can switch to allocation Y and increase his profits by 10 points 
and decrease player 2's profits by 20 points. As basic endowment in the game with positive 
externalities player 1 receives 20 points and player 2 receives 50 points. By choosing Y, 
player 1 can increase his profits by 10 points and player 2 will also gain 10 points.  
Setting I I I :  Active  agent  holds  lower  economic  status,  relatively  strong  positive 
externalities 
In  order  to  analyze  the  effect  of  the  extent  of  the  positive  externalities  on  people's 
intuition whether foreseen externalities were intentional, we conduct Setting III. Setting II and 
III only differ with respect to the game with positive externalities. In Setting III, the positive 
externalities are stronger than player 1’s gain by choosing Y ( ). The 
players’ economic status remains as in Setting II ( , and  ). There 
is still no efficiency gain under Y in the game with negative externalities. 
In  the  game  with  positive  externalities,  both  players  receive  20  points  as  basic 
endowment. By choosing Y, player 1 can increase his profits by 10 points. By doing so, 
player 2 will gain 40 points.  
Procedure 
We conducted 8 sessions in the time from January till June 2009. All sessions were 
played at the LakeLab (TWI/University of Konstanz) with a total number of 180 participants 
(60 players 3). None of the subjects participated in more than one session. Three sessions 
consisted of Setting I and II and five sessions included Setting I and III. This means all 
participants received Setting I, 75 of them additionally received Setting II and the remaining 
105 subjects received Setting III. 
Before the game started, subjects were randomly assigned to their role as player 1, 2 or 
3. Each subject sat at a randomly assigned PC terminal and was given a copy of instructions.
3 
A  set  of  control  questions  was  provided  to  ensure  the  understanding  of  the  game.  The 
experiment did not start until all subjects had answered all questions correctly. We use a 
within subject design in order to be able to distinguish inequality aversion from punishment 
and reward. In every game, players were rematched and played the games in randomized 
                                                 
3 Instructions can be found in the appendix.   9 
order with no apparent order effects. The control games for inequality aversion were played 
after the other games at the end of the experiment. Subjects did not receive feedback until the 
end of their sixth game in order to avoid learning. For each game player 1 and 2 received the 
payoff from the allocation and the points assigned by player 3. Player 3 received 100 points 
for  every  game.  For  player  3  we  use  the  strategy  method.  That  means,  without  actually 
knowing player 1's decision, player 3 redistributes points for both possible decisions.
4 One 
point was converted into 0.01 euros. The experiment took about 30 minutes, average income 
of a participant was 3.77 euros (4.87 $). Participants played the game after having participated 
in another experiment which was no related in any way
5.  
  Number of players 3 
Setting I  60 
Setting II  25 
Setting III  35 
Table 3: Number of Participants 
3  Design of the Questionnaire-Studies and Procedure 
In order to close the circle and return to experimental philosophy, all 180 participants 
were  asked  to  answer  both  Knobe  questions  at  the  end  of  the  experiment.  Participants 
received the questions in randomized order. The answers to the questionnaire studies had no 
consequences on the participants’ payoff. Additionally, we conducted a second and a third 
questionnaire study. Each of these two questionnaires studies contained two stories similar to 
the Knobe stories.  
In the original Knobe questions the reader can form his own view about the situation 
since no information on the agents’ economic status and the extent of the externalities is 
given.  However  there  is  one  indication  for  the  reader  that  player  3  in  the  experiment  is 
missing. In the stories the chairman states, ‘I don’t care at all about harming the environment. 
I just want to make as much profit as I can’. In order to prove that the Knobe effect and our 
results do not depend on this statement, we adapt the stories the following way.  
 
                                                 
4  The  use  of  the  strategy  method  (Selten  (1967))  is  still  controversial.  The  strategy  method  and  the  direct 
response method sometimes yield different results (Brosig et al. (2003), Güth et al. (2001),Schotter et al. (1994), 
Solnick (2007), Kübler and Müller (2002), Neugebauer et al. (2002)) and sometimes yield similar results (Cason 
and Mui (1998)), Brandts and Charness (2000), McLeish and Oxoby (2004), Falk and Kosfeld (2006), Cox and 
Deck (2005)), Charness and Levine (2007) state that the strategy method can be problematic in experiments 
where the level of the observed variable is important. Since in our experiment we consider changes in the rate of 
punishment and reward rather than the level of the rate the strategy method should be innocuous. 
5 Fischbacher and Schudy (2010)   10 
HARM II Story  
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, 'We are 
thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will also harm the 
environment.' The chairman of the board answered, ‘Let's start the new program.' They started 
the  new  program,  the  company  increased  its  profits  and  the  environment  was  harmed. 
Question: Did the chairman of the board intentionally harm the environment? 
HELP II Story  
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, 'We are 
thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, and it will also help the 
environment.' The chairman of the board answered, ‘Let's start the new program.' They started 
the  new  program,  the  company  increased  its  profits  and  the  environment  was  helped. 
Question: Did the chairman of the board intentionally help the environment? 
In Settings II and III we switch the economic status of the agents. That is why we also 
conduct an additional questionnaire study with a weak active agent affecting a strong passive 
agent. 
HARM III Story 
The vice-president of a small fast-food restaurant went to the chairman of the board and 
said, 'We are thinking of launching a new burger. It will help us increase profits, but it will 
also harm McDonald’s next door.' The chairman of the board answered, 'I don't care at all 
about harming McDonald’s. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let's launch the new 
burger. 'So the company launched the new burger, increased profits and McDonald’s next 
door was harmed. Question: Did the chairman of the board intentionally harm McDonald’s? 
HELP III Story 
The vice-president of a small fast-food restaurant went to the chairman of the board and 
said, 'We are thinking of launching a new burger. It will help us increase profits, but it will 
also help McDonald’s next door (for example due to higher pedestrian flow).' The chairman 
of the board answered, 'I don't care at all about helping McDonald’s. I just want to make as 
much profit as I can. Let's launch the new burger.' So the company launched the new burger, 
increased profits and McDonald’s next door was helped. Question: Did the chairman of the 
board intentionally help McDonald’s? 
   11 
We  presented  the  HARM/HELP  II  stories  to  82  subjects  at  the  LakeLab 
(TWI/University of Konstanz). The HARM/HELP III stories were presented to 53 subjects at 
the LakeLab and to 34 students at the University of Zurich. Participants received the questions 
in randomized order with no apparent order effects. The experiment and the questionnaires 
were programmed with z-Tree.
6 We recruited participants using the online recruiting system 
ORSEE.
7 
4  Hypotheses  
In this section, we analyze the theoretical predictions for player 3’s decisions when 
allocation Y has been chosen. In each setting, this allocation is the same for the three games. 
Thus, we can compare player 3’s redistribution in the case when the outcome resulted from 
player 1 helping or hurting or when player 1 had no impact at all.  
First, we note that selfish players 3 are indifferent between any transfers since their own 
payoff  is  not  affected  by  their  decision.  Second,  also  players  with  self-centered  inequity 
aversion  as  modeled  in  Fehr  and  Schmidt  (1999)  or  Bolton  and  Ockenfels  (2000)  are 
indifferent in their redistribution decision. Since player 3 has the highest payoff independent 
of the redistribution, the (advantageous) sum of the inequality between player 3’s payoff and 
the payoffs of player 1 and 2 is not affected by the redistribution. If player 3 cares also about 
equality between the other players, then he will equalize the payoff between player 1 and 
player 2 since there are no costs of redistribution. The same is true, if player 3 has convex 
disutility from inequality between his own payoff and the payoff of the other players or if 
player 3 has maximin preferences (Charness and Rabin (2002)), i.e. if he cares about the 
income of the poorest. Gächter and Riedl (2005) argue that entitlements constitute a “moral 
property right” that is influential independent of negotiators’ legal property rights. Since the 
initial allocation can be interpreted as a reference point for property rights, we expect player 3 
to include the initial allocation in his decision on transfer. 
As we have seen above, not all types of non-selfish motives provide a unique prediction 
for  the  decision  of  player 3 .  For  instance,  also  preferences  for  efficiency  do  not  make  a 
prediction for player 3. Nevertheless, equalizing the payoffs of player 1 and player 2 is always 
among  the  optimal  choices  for  player 3   as  long  as  she  has  purely  outcome-oriented  and 
                                                 
6 Fischbacher (2007) 
7 Greiner (2004)   12 
symmetric  preferences.  Furthermore,  outcome-oriented  preferences  do  not  predict  any 
difference between the games within one setting.
8 This leads us to the first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1 (Outcome Hypothesis) 
a) In all games player 3 redistributes from the richer to the poorer. Thus, in the games in 
Setting I, he redistributes points from player 1 to player 2, and in the games in Setting II and 
III player 3 redistributes points from player 2 to player 1.  
b) Within a setting, the decision is independent of the game’s externalities. 
The  Knobe  effect  describes  that  participants  are  willing  to  blame  other  people  for 
negative foreseen externalities, but are not willing to praise them for positive ones. If the 
Knobe effect persists in an experimental economic framework we should expect that player 3 
punishes  others  for  negative  externalities  but  does  not  reward  them  for  positive  ones. 
Therefore, on the one hand, the amount of transferred points to player 1 after a decision 
including  negative  externalities  should  be  higher  than  in  the  control  game  with  no 
externalities included. On the other hand the amount of transferred points to player 1 after a 
decision  including  positive  externalities  should  not  differ  from  the  control  game.  In  our 
experiment, punishment or reward of an action of player 1 can be assessed by comparing the 
assignment of points to player 1 when player 1 did cause the externalities with the situation 
with no negative externalities included. This is captured in Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 2 (Knobe Hypothesis) 
a) Player 3 allocates fewer points to player 1 in games in which Allocation Y involved hurting 
player 2 than in the corresponding benchmark game. 
b) Player 3 allocates the same amount of points to player 1 in games in which Allocation Y 
involved helping player 2 as in the corresponding benchmark game. 
How do these hypotheses relate to theories of non-selfish preferences that are used in 
economics? The models of direct reciprocity as Rabin (1993) or Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 
(2004) are not in line with these hypotheses because in these models only direct kindness or 
unkindness is reciprocated. Since player 3 is not affected by the decision of player 1, these 
models predict neither reward nor punishment. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to study how 
these models assess kindness from player 1 towards player 2. An action is unkind toward a 
player if the action yields a lower payoff than the reference payoff; it is considered as kind if 
                                                 
8 Of course, different behavior on the individual level can result from indifference. However, indifference cannot 
explain any statistical difference between the treatments.   13 
it yields a higher payoff than this reference payoff. The reference payoff is defined as the 
mean of the range of reasonable payoffs. In Rabin’s model, the reasonable payoffs are those 
from Pareto optimal allocations. This means that in our games, hurting is unkind but helping 
is not kind because helping is only a Pareto improvement.
9 Thus, the model of Rabin provides 
an intuition for the Knobe effect. Helping is not considered kind because it does not involve a 
sacrifice.  This  intuition  applies  equally  to  all  our  games  and  corresponds  to  the  Knobe 
hypothesis.  
In the model of Levine (1998), people differ in how much they weight the other players’ 
income. A positive weight means that they are altruistic and a negative weight means that 
they are spiteful. The weight of the other players is unknown but the actions of a player reveal 
information about it. Applied to our games, helping reveals that the player is more altruistic 
than average whereas hurting reveals that the player is more spiteful. This model predicts 
punishment after hurting but also reward after helping. As in the alternative-based reciprocity 
models  discussed  above  intention  depends  on  the  expectation  of  how  player  3 w i l l  
redistribute. Since in the model of Levine reward and punishment are based on the average 
altruism or spite of the players who have chosen a particular action, we can make an empirical 
prediction. Concretely, the more people make a particular unkind decision, the less spiteful is 
this decision on average. The more people make a particular kind decision, the less friendly is 
this  decision  on  average.  Thus,  we  can  derive  a  specific  hypothesis  how  the  aggregate 
behavior of players 1 is related to reward and punishment. 
Hypothesis 3 (Levine Hypotheses)  
a) Punishment in games involving hurt is negatively correlated with the share of players 1 
who choose allocation Y in this situation. 
b) Reward in games involving help is negatively correlated with the share of players 1 who 
choose allocation Y in this situation. 
5  Results 
We structure the results in the following way: First we present the experimental results 
including player 3’s decisions. We test the Outcome hypotheses and the Knobe hypotheses. 
                                                 
9Since player 3 can freely choose how to redistribute the amount determined by player 1, the games could lose 
their characteristics when taking into account the terminal allocation. However, results show that this does not 
happen. Player 3’s transfer does change the initial benefits and costs of the allocations for player 2. In the hurting 
game, even after player 3’s transfer, Y stays the unfavorable allocation for player 2 and in the helping game, Y 
stays the favorable allocation. For player 1 in the harming game the transfer changes Y’s benefit. Choosing Y in 
the harming game then harms player 1 and player 2.    14 
Then we go on to the results of the questionnaire studies. At the end of section we test the 
Levine hypotheses. 
We focus on player 3’s decisions when allocation Y has been chosen. For each setting 
there  are  three  games  with  different  externalities:  positive,  negative  and  no  externalities. 
Allocation Y stays the same for the three games. Thus, we can easily compare player 3’s 
transfer depending on positive externalities, negative externalities or no externalities at all.  
5.1    Outcome- Hypothesis 
In order to analyze player 3’s transfer between the other two players we look at the 
amount of transferred points from player 2 to player 1. Table 4 and Figure 1 give the transfer 
of player 3 from player 1 to player 2 for Settings I-III. If player 3 cares for equality of 
allocations, we should expect that he redistributes points from the richer to the poorer. In 
order to equalize payoffs, player 3 would have to transfer 15 points. These 15 points hold for 
a benchmark and are given by the variable Equality. No externalities list the transferred points 
for the control game without any externalities. Transferred points from player 2 to player 1 in 
the harm and help condition are given in negative and positive externalities, respectively. 
 
  Equality  Externalities 
    no  negative   positive 
Setting I  -15  -14.68  -19.89  -13.75 
Setting II  15  14.52  14.00  13.00 
Setting III  15  12.71  12.57  17.29 
All numbers are different from 0, (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.000) 
Table 4: Transfer to player 1 by player 3 when Y is chosen in Settings I-III 
 
 
Figure 1: Transfer to player 1from player 2 by player 3   15 
 
In all games with no side effects, participants’ transfer from the richer to the poorer and 
the amount of transferred points does not differ from equality (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, 
Setting I: p=0.319, Setting II: p=0.338, Setting III: p=0.208). This is consistent with perfect 
inequality aversion and maximin. In all other games player 3 also transfers points from the 
richer to the poorer (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.000). These results confirm Hypotheses 
1a and 1b. Participants are inequality averse and this inequality aversion is independent of the 
games’ externalities. With no side effects included, participants transfer points in order to 
achieve the exactly equal split. We will see in the next section how externalities affect the 
participants’ willingness to reciprocate. 
5.2    Knobe-Hypothesis 
The Knobe effect describes the effect that people blame others for negative externalities 
but do not praise them for positive ones. In our experiment we measure this behavior by 
comparing transfers for agents having caused an externality with transfers for agents having 
caused no externality. This allows us to control for player 3’s individual inequality aversion. 
Table 5 and Figure 2 give the reciprocity transfer




  Externalities 
  negative   positive 
Setting I  -5.30***  0.93* 
Setting II  -0.52  -1.52 
Setting III  -0.14  4.58** 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, different from 0, *: p < 0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01. 
Table 5: Reciprocity transfer to player 1 by player 3 when Y is chosen in Settings I-III 
 
                                                 
10 Reciprocity transfer is transferred points from player 2 to player 1 after an externality minus the transferred 
points in the control game no externalities. Net transfer is independent from inequality aversion.   16 
 
Figure 2: Reciprocity transfer to player 1 by player 3 
Reciprocity transfer =transferred points from player 2 to player 1 after an externality minus transferred points in 
the control game no externalities.  
 
Setting I 
In the game with negative externalities, we find that apart from reasons of inequality 
aversion,  subjects  also  react  to  the  negative  externalities  (Wilcoxon  signed-rank  test, 
p=0.002). This confirms Hypotheses 2a. Comparing the game with positive externalities with 
the game without externalities, we find just a small difference in redistribution. That means 
that participants only slightly redistribute less than they redistribute due to inequality aversion 
(Wilcoxon  signed-rank  test,  p=0.080).  This  confirms  Hypothesis  2b.  We  find  significant 
differences between the games with negative and positive side effects (Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test,  p=0.000).  That  shows  that  subjects  react  more  strongly  to  negative  than  to  positive 
externalities. To summarize: The Knobe effect can be found in Setting I. Participants do not 
reward others for positive externalities but punish them for negative ones. This confirms both 
parts of Hypothesis 2. 
Setting II 
We  do  not  find  that  externalities  matter  in  Setting  II.
11  Subjects  do  not  punish  the 
producer of negative externalities nor do they reward the producer of positive ones. An active 
agent  with  lower  economic  status  leads  to  the  ignorance  of  all  side  effects.  The  agents' 
economic  status  affects  the  appearance  of  the  Knobe  effect.  These  results  contradict 
                                                 
11Negative  externalities  do  not  vary  redistribution  due  to  inequality  aversion  (Wilcoxon  signed-rank  test, 
p=0.373). Positive externalities do not vary redistribution due to inequality aversion (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, 
p=0.581). We also do not find significant differences in redistribution comparing the game with positive with the 
game with negative externalities (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.679). 
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Hypotheses 2a and confirm Hypotheses 2b. The Knobe effect cannot be found. When the 
producer of the externality holds the lower economic status, participants do neither punish 
him for negative externalities nor do they reward him for positive ones. The results of Setting 
II also give evidence that the efficiency loss in the hurt game is not the driving force behind 
the Knobe effect. The efficiency loss is still present in Setting II. However, the Knobe effect 
has vanished. 
Setting III 
We used the additional treatment Setting III in order to test how people's willingness to 
reward  foreseen  externalities  depends  on  the  size  of  the  positive  externalities.  Negative 
externalities do not affect participants willingness to redistribute (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, 
p=0.242). Subjects do not punish others for caused negative side effects in Setting III. This 
contradicts  Hypothesis  2a.  However,  subjects  do  reward  others  for  caused  positive  side 
effects. Positive side effects significantly increase the willingness to redistribute (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, p=0.013). This result contradicts Hypothesis 2b and also leads to significant 
differences  in  redistribution  between  the  games  with  positive  and  negative  side  effects 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.015). These findings reverse the Knobe effect. When the 
positive externality is sufficiently strong producer of the externality holds the lower economic 
status, participants reward others for positive externalities but do not punish them for negative 
ones.  
5.3    Results of the Questionnaires 
The results of the last sections show that the economic status of the agent causing an 
externality is a crucial determinant of the Knobe effect. For the sake of completeness we 
verify this result by conducting three additional questionnaire-studies. The first study contains 
of the two original Knobe questions.  
In the second study we modify the original stories by eliminating the part: “'I don't care 
at all about harming the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can.” We 
therefore omit the chairman’s statement on not caring about the environment. 
In the third questionnaire study we modify the original stories by switching the economic 
status of the agents.  
We present the results of the Knobe questions in Table 6. They reflect Knobe's original 
results. 80% of the 180 participants state that the firm intentionally harmed the environment, 
but only 19% think that the firm intentionally helped the environment. This difference is 
significant and there are no apparent order effects (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.000). On   18 
the basis of a within-subject comparison, we find that 51% of the participants think that the 
firm intentionally harmed but did not intentionally help the environment. 3% of the subjects 
state that that firm intentionally helped but did not intentionally harm the environment. 30% 
and  16%  say  that  the  firm  harmed  and  helped  intentionally  or  did  not  harm  and  help 
intentionally, respectively.
12 As in Setting I we confirm the Knobe effect. 
 
 
























not intentionally  
3%  30%  33% 
  total  19%  81%   
Table 6: Percentage of participants who state intentionality in the Knobe questions 
 
                                                 
12 Subjects received the questions in random order with no apparent order effects.   19 
 
 


























not intentionally  
2%  32%  34% 
  total  24%  76%   































not intentionally  
6%  67%  73% 
  total  15%  85%   
Table 8: Percentage of participants who state intentionality in the HARM III questions 
 
We also confirm the Knobe effect in the HARM II questions. Table 7 shows that 66% 
of the 82 participants think that the firm intentionally harmed the environment, but only 24% 
think that the chairman intentionally helped the environment. These results are not statistically 
different  from  the  results  of  the  original  Knobe  questions ( Mann-Whitney,  p>0.397).  We 
therefore conclude that our results do not depend on the missing statement on the chairman’s 
attitude to the environment.  
The results of the HARM III questions are presented in Table 8.
13 The share of the 87 
participants saying that the firm intentionally helped McDonald’s (15%) does not differ from 
the share of participants (19%) that stated intentionality in the original Knobe helping vignette 
(Mann-Whitney, p=0.680). However, there is a significant decrease in the share of people 
                                                 
13 There are no apparent order or subject- pool effects.   20 
thinking that the firm intentionally harmed McDonald’s (27%) compared to the share in the 
original Knobe harming vignette (67%) (Mann-Whitney, p=0.000)). As in the experiment, the 
Knobe effect also vanishes in questionnaires when the producer of the externality holds the 
lower economic status 
5.4    Levine-Hypotheses 
In  Section  4  we  derived  the  predictions  of  theories  of  non-selfish  preferences.  The 
model  of  Levine  (1998)  predicts  punishment  after  hurting  but  also  reward  after  helping. 
Concretely, the more people make a particular unkind decision the lower is punishment for 
this decision. The more people make a particular kind decision the lower is reward for this 
decision. In this section we compare our results with the theoretical predictions by Levine. 
Following Levine we should expect that punishment for a negative externality and reward for 
a  positive  externality  is  negatively  correlated  with  the  share  of  players  1  producing  this 
externality.  Table  8  gives  the  decisions  of  players  1.
14  Table  9  gives  the  results  of  the 
regressions.  
  Fraction of players 1 choosing Y 
Setting I (help)  0.83 
Setting II (help)  0.92 
Setting III (help)  0.77 
Setting I (hurt)  0.53 
Setting II (hurt)
   0.76 
Setting III (hurt)  0.83 
Table 9: Decisions of player 1 
                                                 
14 Switching the economic status increases harming choices. (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.057), whereas helping 
choices are not affected (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.496). The size of the positives externalities does not affect 
harming choices (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.53257) nor helping choices (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.171). 
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  Games with negative 
externalities only 
Games with positive 
externalities only 
Fraction of players 1 choosing Y  -18.52 (9.14)**  -40.34 (15.15)*** 
Constant  15.11 (5.92)**  35.01 (13.13)*** 
Number of obs  120  120 
F(1,59)  4.11  7.09 
Prob>F  0.0472  0.0100 
R-squared  0.0308  0.0430 
Number of clusters  60  60 
*: p < 0.10, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01. 
Table 10: Regression with robust standard errors, clustered on subject 
Dependent variable reciprocity, i.e. punishment in first column and reward in second column, standard 
errors in parentheses 
 
 
In  this  regression,  we  use  the  fraction  of  players  1  choosing  Y  as  a  predictor  of 
reciprocity. The first regression shows that punishment is negatively correlated with the share 
of people who choose the unkind allocation Y. The second regression shows that reward is 
negatively correlated with the share of people who choose the kind allocation Y. Our findings 
are in line with Levine’s predictions and confirm Hypotheses 3a and 3b. The more players 1 
choose to harm or to help, the less they are punished or rewarded, respectively. 
6  Conclusion 
In this paper, we compare punishment for negative externalities with reward for positive 
ones. In order to do so, we make a methodological contribution to the literature comparing 
punishment and reward. Most studies so far analyze punishment and reward with punishment 
being efficiency reducing, while reward is not. This means that effects cannot be directly 
compared and punishment and reward must be treated separately. In this study, using costless 
third-party punishment, we get a clean direct comparison of positive and negative reciprocity.  
We  use  this  design  to  address  the  question  why  people  blame  others  for  negative 
externalities but do not reward them for positive ones. This paper analyzes this asymmetric 
behavior (the so-called Knobe effect) and tests the stability and economic determinants of 
situations in which the Knobe effect arises. We find that producers of negative externalities 
are blamed if the externality harms an economically weaker party. If the harmed party is 
economically stronger, the producer is not blamed. Producers of positive externalities are 
rewarded if they affect an economically stronger party and if the externality is large enough.   22 
We  find  the  Knobe  effect w ithout  the  use  of  the  word  intentionally.  Therefore w e  
conclude  that  the  Knobe  effect  does  not  depend  on  language  but  on  the  economic 
determinants of the situation such as economic power and the size of the positive externality. 
Since  in  all  tested  situations  the  negative  externalities  are  efficiency  decreasing,  but  the 
Knobe effect is only present when the producer of the externality holds the higher economic 
status, we conclude that the Knobe effect does not depend on efficiency considerations. Our 
results are in line with the theoretical predictions of a naïve version of the model by Levine 
(1998). 
We can summarize our findings the following way. Economically strong producers of 
negative  externalities  and  economically  weak  producers  of  large  positive  externalities 
experience  the  meaning  of  the  saying  ‘What  goes  around,  comes  around”.  Positive 
externalities  caused  by  agents  holding  a  high  economic  status  and  negative  externalities 
caused by agents holding a low economic status do not trigger reciprocal reactions. Firms 
have to be aware of these asymmetric ascriptions of intentions. Economically strong firms 
will be blamed for negative externalities, but cannot expect to be rewarded for positive ones – 
just like the Swabian saying ’Not nagging is praise enough’. For economically weak firms the 
saying does not hold though. They will not be blamed for negative externalities and if positive 
externalities are large enough, they can even expect reward.   23 
7  Appendix 
7.1  Instructions - Player 1 
There will now take place an additional experiment. In this experiment there are players 1, 
players 2 and players 3. This experiment is not related to the first experiment. The participants 
are rematched. A player A in the experiment can now be a player 1, 2 or 3. Also the players B 
and C are now players 1, 2 or 3. You are a player 1. 
Also during this experiment we do not use euros but points. All points you receive during the 
experiment will be changed into euros at the end of the experiment: 100 points =1 euro. The 
following pages give you instructions on the course of the experiment. First, we are going to 
explain the basic situation. After having read the instructions you are going to find some 
control  questions  on  the  screen.  The  experiment  will  start  as  soon  as  all  participants  are 
familiar  with  the  experiment.  THE  EXPERIMENT:  There  are  6  decision  situations.  One 
group contains one player 1, one player 2 and one player 3. For every decision round the 
groups are going to be rematched. Before the decision starts, all participants learn the initial 
situation. In the next step you can change this initial situation. After your decision, player 3 
can transfer points from you to player 2 or from player 2 to you. Player 2 does not have to 
make a decision. We are going to explain the decision situation in the following example. 
EXAMPLE: You receive 30 points and player 2 receives 50 points. You can keep this initial 
allocation or change it. If you change it, you receive 10 points more, which is a total of 40 
points. In this case player 2 receives 20 points more, which is a total of 70 points. Player 2 
does not make a decision. 
  player 1 (you)  player 2 
Initial Situation  30  50 
Change  +10  +20 
Situation after Change  40  70 
At the beginning of every round, player 3 receives 100 points. After your decision player 3 
can transfer points from you to player 2 or from player 2 to you. For example he can take 
away points from you in order to give them to player 2. Or you can take away points from 
player 2 in order to give them to you. Assume, you keep the initial situation and player 3 
transfers 5 points from player 2 to you. Then the allocation looks like this: 
player 1 (you)  player 2 
40+5=45  70-5=65 
Assume, you change the initial situation and player 3 transfers 20 points from you to player 2. 
Then the allocation looks like this:   24 
player 1 (you)  player 2 
40-20=20  70+20=90 
By now clicking on the OK Button you will receive some control questions that you can 
answer directly on screen. 
 
7.2    Instructions - Player 2 
There will now take place an additional experiment. In this experiment there are players 1, 
players 2 and players 3. This experiment is not related to the first experiment. The participants 
are rematched. A player A in the experiment can now be a player 1, 2 or 3. Also the players B 
and C are now players 1, 2 or 3. You are a player 2. Also during this experiment we do not 
use euros but points. All points you receive during the experiment will be changed into Euros 
at the end of the experiment: 100 points =1 euro. The following pages give you instructions 
on the course of the experiment. First, we are going to explain the basic situation. After 
having read the instructions you are going to find some control questions on the screen. The 
experiment  will  start  as  soon  as  all  participants  are  familiar  with  the  experiment.  THE 
EXPERIMENT: There are 6 decision situations. One group contains one player 1, one player 
2 and one player 3. For every decision round the groups are going to be rematched. Before the 
decision starts, all participants learn the initial situation. In the next step player 1 can change 
this initial situation. After player 1's decision, player 3 can transfer points from you to player 
1 or from player 1 to you. You do not have to make a decision. We are going to explain the 
decision situation in the following example: 
EXAMPLE: player 1 receives 30 points and you receive 50 points. Player 1 can keep this 
initial allocation or change it. If he changes it, player 1 receives 10 points more, which is a 
total of 40 points. In this case you receive 20 points more, which is a total of 70 points. You 
do not make a decision. 
  player 1   player 2 (you) 
Initial Situation  30  50 
Change  +10  +20 
Situation after Change  40  70 
At the beginning of every round player 3 receives 100 points. After player 1's decision player 
3 can transfer points from you to player 1 or from player 1 to you. For example he can take 
away points from you in order to give them to player 1. Or you can take away points from 
player 1 in order to give them to you.   25 
Assume, player 1 keeps the initial situation and player 3 transfers 5 points from you to player 
1. Then the allocation looks like this: 
player 1   player 2 (you) 
40+5=45  70-5=65 
Assume, player 1 changes the initial situation and player 3 transfers 20 points from player 1 to 
you. Then the allocation looks like this: 
player 1   player 2 (you) 
40-20=20  70+20=90 
By now clicking on the OK Button you will receive some control questions that you can 
answer directly on screen. 
 
7.3    Instructions - Player 3 
There will now take place an additional experiment. In this experiment there are players 1, 
player 2 and players 3. This experiment is not related to the first experiment. The participants 
are rematched. A player A in the experiment can now be a player 1, 2 or 3. Also the players B 
and C are now players 1, 2 or 3. You are a player 3. Also during this experiment we do not 
use euros but points. All points you receive during the experiment will be changed into euros 
at the end of the experiment: 100 points = 1euro. The following pages give you instructions 
on the course of the experiment. First, we are going to explain the basic situation. After 
having read the instructions you are going to find some control questions on the screen. The 
experiment  will  start  as  soon  as  all  participants  are  familiar  with  the  experiment.  THE 
EXPERIMENT: There are 6 decision situations. One group contains one player 1, one player 
2 and one player 3. For every decision round the groups are going to be rematched. Before the 
decision starts, all participants learn the initial situation. In the next step player 1 can change 
this initial situation. After player 1's decision, you can transfer points from player 1 to player 
2 or from player 2 to player 1. Player 2 does not have to make a decision. We are going to 
explain the decision situation in the following example. EXAMPLE: player 1 receives 30 
points and player 2 receives 50 points, player 1 can keep this initial allocation or change it. If 
he changes it, he receives 10 points more, which is a total of 40 points. In this case player 2 
receives 20 points more, which is a total of 70 points. Player 2 does not make a decision.   26 
 
  player 1  player 2 
Initial Situation  30  50 
Change  +10  +20 
Situation after Change  40  70 
At the beginning of every round, you being player 3, receive 100 points. After player 1's 
decision you can transfer points from player 1 to player 2 or from player 2 to player 1. For 
example you can take away points from player 1 in order to give them to player 2. Or you can 
take away points from player 2 in order to give them to player 1. You are going to make your 
decision  before  you  know  how  player 1   decides.  That  means  you  have  to  indicate  your 
decision  for  both  decision  possibilities  of  player 1 .  You  therefore  have  to  answer  the 
following two questions: 
Assume player 1 keeps the initial situation: 
How many points do you want to transfer from player 1 to player 2? 
How many points do you want to transfer from player 2 to player 1? 
Assume player 1 changes the initial situation: 
How many points do you want to transfer from player 1 to player 2? 
How many points do you want to transfer from player 2 to player 1? 
Please note: You can only transfer in one direction. That means, you cannot transfer points 
from player 1 to player 2 and transfer points from player 2 to player 1. Assume, player 1 
keeps  the  initial  situation  and  you  transfer  5  points  from  player 2   to  player 1 .  Then  the 
allocation looks like this: 
  player 1  player 2 
Old  40  70 
new  40+5=45  70-5=65 
Assume, player 1 changes the initial situation and you transfer 20 points from player 1 to 
player 2. Then the allocation looks like this: 
  player 1  player 2 
Old  40  70 
new  40-20=20  70+20=90 
After your decision, you will see the new allocation for player 1 and 2 on your screen. You 
then have the possibility to confirm or change your decision. In every case you receive 100 
points. By now clicking on the OK Button you receive some control questions that you can 
answer directly on screen.   27 
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